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Abstract. The ADTool is free, open source software assisting graphical mod-
eling and quantitative analysis of security, using attack–defense trees. The
main features of the ADTool are easy creation, efficient editing, and auto-
mated bottom-up evaluation of security-relevant measures. The tool also sup-
ports the usage of attack trees, protection trees and defense trees, which are
all particular instances of attack–defense trees.
1 Introduction
Graphical security models provide an intuitive but systematic methodology to visu-
alize possible attacks and countermeasures and to enable the computation of various
security related parameters. Thus, they have been widely accepted by the industrial
sector, as a means to support and facilitate threat analysis and risk management
processes. Graphical models have been used for security analysis of SCADA systems
[8,32], of voting systems [23,7], of vehicular communication systems [12,2], of Internet
related attacks [33,24], and of socio-technical attacks [4,11,30]. This paper presents the
ADTool software [21] which supports quantitative and qualitative security assessment
using a graphical security modeling technique called attack–defense trees.
1.1 Background
Attack–defense trees (ADTrees) [17] extend and improve the well-known formalism
of attack trees, by including not only the actions of an attacker, but also possible
counteractions of a defender. Hence, an ADTree can be seen as a game between two
opposite players: an attacker trying to compromise a system and a defender trying
to protect the system [16]. The root of the tree represents the main goal of one of
the players. Using an AND-OR tree structure, this main goal is then refined into
less complex subgoals that need to be reached in order to achieve the objective of
the root. Every node of an ADTree can also be counteracted. This is depicted using a
subtree rooted in a node of the opposite player. Since interactions between an attacker
and a defender are modeled explicitly in ADTrees, the extended formalism allows for
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a more thorough and accurate security analysis compared to attack trees, without
however requiring additional computational power [20]. A toy example of an ADTree,
representing how to attack a server, is given in Figure 2.
Theoretical foundations of the ADTree methodology, including a graphical and
a term-based syntax as well as numerous formal semantics, have been introduced
in [17]. A mathematical framework for quantitative evaluation of ADTrees has been
developed in [18]. It is based on the notion of attributes, which allow us to formalize
and specify relevant security metrics. Standard quantitative analysis of ADTrees relies
on a step-wise computation procedure. Numerical values are assigned to all atomic
actions, represented by the non-refined nodes1. The values for the remaining nodes,
including the root of the tree, are deduced automatically in a bottom-up way. This
bottom-up algorithm makes use of attribute domains which specify operators to be
used while calculating values for different node configurations of an ADTree. In [19],
we have developed guidelines for intuitive and formal specification and classification
of the most popular measures for attack trees and ADTrees. There, we also provide
guidelines for how to properly specify an attribute, so that it can be evaluated on
ADTrees using the bottom-up algorithm.
1.2 Motivation
While validating the ADTree approach on a large industrial case study [4], it became
apparent that the practical use of the methodology requires dedicated tool support.
Lack of such support may result in numerous modeling difficulties and computational
errors. On the one hand, there exist a number of commercial software applications for
attack tree-like modeling, including SecurITree [3], and AttackTree+ [13]. However,
these are closed source tools and their use is not free of charge. On the other hand,
existing academic software, such as SeaMonster [26], does not support quantitative
analysis and uniformly integrated defenses.
The above observations motivated the development of the ADTool, which
– is a free and open source application;
– supports quantitative and qualitative analysis of tree-based models integrating
attack and defense components;
– is based on well-founded formal framework;
– guides the user in constructing syntactically correct models;
– allows to draw visually appealing trees;
– facilitates sharing, management and updating of the models;
– helps in verification of numerical values provided by the users;
– automates computation of security related parameters.
This paper provides an overview of the main features, practical capabilities, and
the architecture of the ADTool. For a complete description of how to use the tool, we
refer to the ADTool manual [22].
2 Main features of the ADTool
The goal of the ADTool is to provide security consultants as well as academic re-
searchers with a rigorous but user-friendly application that supports security analysis
1 Unlike in attack trees, a non-refined node of an ADTree is not necessarily a leaf. Such a
node does not have any refining children but can still be countered.
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and risk assessment process using attack–defense trees. It integrates two crucial mod-
eling aspects: the creation of security models and their quantitative analysis. From a
formal perspective, attack trees [31,25], protection trees [10], and defense trees [5] are
instances of attack–defense trees. Thus, the ADTool can also be employed to automate
and facilitate the usage of all aforementioned formalisms.
2.1 Security modeling using ADTool
One of the main features of the ADTool is its user-friendliness. The tool is guiding
the user in constructing models that comply with the graphical ADTree language, as
described in [18]. All options that allow to modify or refine a given component of a
model can be accessed by right-clicking the node, as shown in Figure 1. Alternatively,
intuitive keyboard shortcuts can be used to create, alter or remove a subtree [22].
Fig. 1. Creating an ADTree in ADTool.
An improved version of Walker’s algorithm [34], with enhancements suggested by
Buchheim et al. [6], has been implemented in the ADTool to produce trees having an
appealing layout. Furthermore, when an ADTree is built, the corresponding attack–
defense term (ADTerm) is immediately displayed, as shown in Figure 2. ADTerms
form a compact, algebraic representation of ADTrees. In order to link a term model
with its graphical counterpart, the shortest tree edit distance algorithm [9,29] has
been implemented. It ensures that when an ADTerm is modified, the corresponding
ADTree is adapted accordingly.
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Fig. 2. An ADTree modeled in ADTool.
Finally, the ADTool provides advanced features for model manipulation and man-
agement. Folding, expanding and zooming options make the analysis of large models
possible. Temporarily hiding parts of a tree permits users to focus on the displayed
components. This is highly appreciated during industrial meetings and presentations.
ADTrees created with the ADTool can be saved as special .adt files, which enables
their reuse and modification. Models can also be exported to vector graphics files
(pdf), raster graphics files (png, jpeg) and LATEX files (tex). Resulting figures can
be used as illustrations in scientific and industrial presentations, research papers and
posters. A dedicated option, illustrated in Figure 3, makes it possible to print trees
on a specified number of pages, which enhances readability of large-scale models.
2.2 Quantitative analysis using ADTool
The bottom-up algorithm for evaluation of attributes on ADTrees has been imple-
mented in the ADTool. Supported measures include: attributes based on real values
(e.g., time, cost, probability), attributes based on levels (e.g., required skill level,
reachability of the goal in less than k units of time), and Boolean properties (e.g.,
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Fig. 3. Large-scale printing using ADTool.
satisfiability of a scenario). The implemented measures can be computed from the
point of view of an attacker (e.g., the cost of an attack), of a defender (e.g., the
cost of defending a system), or relate to both of them (e.g., overall maximum power
consumption). By using different attribute domains, we distinguish between situa-
tions when actions are executed simultaneously and when they need to be performed
sequentially. The choice of an attribute is illustrated in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Attribute selection in ADTool.
After a user has selected an attribute, the tool decorates the ADTree with default
values representing the worst case scenario, e.g., infinite cost or maximal required skill
level. The user then customizes the inputs for the relevant non-refined nodes directly
on the tree or uses an overview table, as shown in Figure 5. The use of the table is
particularly helpful in case of large models. The tool ensures that the provided values
are consistent and belong to a specified value domain. This is especially important
when several specialists supply values for different parts of the tree. Nodes labeled
5
with the same name, i.e., representing the same action, automatically receive the same
value. Such a design choice is consistent with the ADTree methodology, as specified
in [18]. If a value for a non-refined node is modified, ADTool automatically computes
the values of the remaining nodes using the bottom-up algorithm. By restricting the
user input to the minimum and by automating computations, we avoid calculation
errors.
Fig. 5. Attribute evaluation in the ADTool.
2.3 Evaluation of ADTool
The ADTool easily handles trees containing a few thousand nodes. The complexity
of the bottom-up algorithm for evaluation of attributes on ADTrees is linear with
respect to the size of the tree, i.e., its number of nodes, and the computations are
performed instantaneously. Thus, the quantitative analysis using ADTool scales very
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well. The limiting factor of the application is the graphical display of the models. For
trees of more than ten thousand nodes, a delay of about five seconds occurs when a
new node is added. This is due to the recalculation of the positions of some nodes.
ADTool is programmed in Java. Implementation in C++ would run faster, but its
development overhead would be much higher.
ADTool presents a number of advantages compared to existing tools employed for
attack tree-based modeling. Graphical security models are usually prepared with the
help of non-dedicated drawing tools. In this case, the user himself needs to make sure
that the models he creates are syntactically correct. Since ADTool guides the user
in creating only well-formed models, its employment does not require an in-depth
knowledge of the technical details of the underlying methodology.
Another strong point of our application is that it supports both: creation and
management of graphical models as well as their quantitative analysis. Existing pro-
totype tools usually concentrate on one of the above aspects only. On the one hand,
applications such as SeaMonster [26] support creation of security models, but they
do not provide means to perform computations. On the other hand, most academic
tools designed for quantitative analysis are command-line programs and they do not
support visual representation of the analyzed models.
Finally, the ADTree methodology and the computation procedures implemented
in ADTool have sound theoretical foundations [14]. In particular, the meaning of all
attributes supported by the tool is clearly defined and the underlying mathematical
models are well-studied from the formal point of view [17,18,19]. Together with the
fact that ADTool is a free and open source application, this makes it a good alternative
for commercial software for attack tree-based modeling, such as [3,13], etc.
3 Implementation Characteristics
The application has been written in a modular way with a clear distinction between
the GUI and the Implementation Model. An overview of the ADTool architecture is
depicted in Figure 6. The Implementation Model consists of the Tree Model (which
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Fig. 6. An overview of the ADTool architecture
stores the basic tree structure), Domain Classes (defining the implemented attribute
domains), and Quantitative Models (which are derived from Domain Classes and
contain inserted and computed values). The functionality of the tool can easily be
extended by defining new attributes. For this purpose, a new Domain Class needs to
be created and compiled. Domain Classes have been designed to be simple, in order to
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make it possible for a user with minimal knowledge of Java to add a new domain. Due
to the use of Java reflection, no recompilation or other modifications of the program
are required after adding a new Domain Class.
The ADTool is open source software that runs on all common operating systems
(Windows, Linux, Mac OS). It is implemented in Java and its source code is about
16 000 LOC. In order to run the program, JDK 6 or later is required. Additionally the
ADTool depends on the following free libraries: abego TreeLayout [1], implementing
an efficient and customizable tree layout algorithm in Java, and InfoNode Docking
Windows [27], a pure Java Swing based docking windows framework, allowing to set
up windows in a flexible way and to save and restore their layout. The ADTool is
available for download at http://satoss.uni.lu/software/adtool/. It can also be
launched as an online application that uses the Java Web Start technology [28].
4 Conclusion
The ADTool is free and open source software for the creation and quantitative analysis
of tree-based security models integrating attack and defense components. The tool
has been extensively tested and has proven to be able to handle realistic models of
large size. Its modular architecture allows for an easy extension of the application’s
capabilities.
The ADTool is currently used in a case study where quantitative threat analysis of
an electronic voting system is performed. Furthermore, we are working on combining
the attack–defense tree methodology with Bayesian Networks, to make probabilistic
reasoning about scenarios involving dependent actions possible. Related theoretical
findings and newly identified features will be implemented in the next versions of the
ADTool.
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